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Rosenberg v. Fleuti: Reentry of Aliens
Remains Unsettled
I. Introduction
"Entry" is a term of art for purposes of United States immigration law.I An
alien making an entry into this country must comply with rigid admission stan-
dards. Reentry is a subcategory of entry which deals with aliens previously ad-
mitted to the United States who seek to return after a temporary absence. The
reentry doctrine subjects returning aliens to the same admission requirements as
first-time entrants. Failure to meet these requirements may result in exclusion at
the time of attempted reentry or deportation on the ground that reentry should
not have been permitted.
2
In 1963 the Supreme Court of the United States, in Rosenberg v. Fleu/i,3 faced
the issue of whether a resident alien's return to the United States after a tempo-
rary absence constituted an entry for immigration purposes. The Court defined
entry to include only those returns to the United States by resident aliens which
followed departures made with "an intent to depart in a manner which can be
regarded as meaningfully interruptive of the alien's permanent residence." 4 Con-
trary to its intended effect, the Feuti decision has led to confusion and conflicting
interpretations in the lower courts. 5 This note will examine the present status of
the Fleuti doctrine and the reasons for its failure to provide courts with a worka-
ble judicial standard.
II. Historical Setting of Rosenberg v. Fleuti
The reentry doctrine was created by case law during the first half of this
century.6 The most commonly recognized pronouncement of the doctrine, that
1 See C. GORDON & E. GORDON, IMMIGRATION LAW & PROCEDURE § 2.3(a) (desk ed. 1980).
2 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (1976) (grounds for exclusion) with 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976) (grounds
for deportation). Reentering aliens may be excluded or deported because they (1) are insane at the time of
reentry, (2) suffered a previous attack of insanity, (3) have admitted the elements of a crime of moral
turpitude for which they were never convicted or (4) are otherwise ineligible for citizenship. 8 U.S.C. §§
(a)(l), (3), (9), (22) (1976). None of these conditions would subject the alien to deportation if he had
remained in the country after his initial entry. See generallv I C. GORDON & H. ROSENFELD, IMMIGRATION
LAW & PROCEDURE §§ 2.32-.50 (rev. ed. 1980); Comment, Exclusion and Deportation of Resident Aliens: The
Re-entqy Doctrine and the Need for Reform, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 192 (1975).
3 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
4 Id at 462.
5 Cf Longaria Castaneda v. INS, 548 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1977) (returning alien deported for assisting
in the illegal entry of aliens); Ferrano v. INS, 535 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1976) (remand of deportation order to
determine whether reentry without inspection affects resident alien status); Lozano-Giron v. INS, 506 F.2d
1073 (7th Cir. 1974) (returning alien deported after being apprehended smuggling counterfeit United
States currency into the country); Palatian v. INS, 502 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1974) (returning aliens' attempt
to smuggle marijuana into the country after two and one-half days in Mexico held an entry even if depar-
ture was for innocent purposes); Vargas Barnelos v. INS, 466 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1972) (returning alien not
deported despite conviction for assisting in the illegal entry of aliens). See general.y Gordon, Recent Develop-
ments in Judicial Review of Immigration Cases, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 13-20 (1977).
6 The Supreme Court in Fleuti recognized the reentry doctrine as originating in Lewis v. Frick, 233
U.S. 291 (1914) and cited United States ex rel. Claussen v. Day, 279 U.S. 398 (1929), United States ex rel.
Polymeris v. Trudell, 284 U.S. 279 (1931), and United States ex re. Stapf v. Corsi, 287 U.S. 129 (1932), as
cases in the line of precedent. 374 U.S. at 453.
REENTRY OF ALIENS
of United States ex rel Voi Oe v. Smith,7 defined entry as "any coming of an alien
from a foreign country into the United States whether such coming be the first or
any subsequent one." 8 This definition subjected returning resident aliens to strict
admission requirements,9 an effect so harsh that some courts enforced the doc-
trine only with reluctance.10 In the late 1940's, courts modified the doctrine,
holding it inapplicable to resident aliens who had no intention of leaving the
United States permanently"1 or who left the country involuntarily.'
2
Di Pasquale v. Karnuth 13 was the first case holding the reentry requirements
inapplicable where the resident alien's prior departure had been unintentional.
The defendant, a resident alien, challenged deportation proceedings based on an
entry which occurred during a train trip from Buffalo, New York, to Detroit.
Unknown to the defendant, the train was routed through Canada. Judge
Learned Hand, writing for the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, did not allow the defendant to be deported based on his reentry because
there was no evidence that he "knew or had any intentions of leaving the United
States .... ,,14 Shortly after Di Pasquale was decided, the Supreme Court in
Delgadillo v. Carmichael1 5 combined the intent requirement with voluntariness and
held that a returning alien does not enter for immigration purposes unless his
prior departure was voluntary or intentional.
1 6
Subsequent to these judicial developments, Congress included a definition of
entry in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA).1 7 Section
101(a)(13)' 8 of the INA defines entry as follows:
The term "entry" means any coming of an alien into the United States, from a for-
eign port or place, or from an outlying possession, whether voluntary or otherwise,
except that an alien having a lawful permanent residence in the United States shall
not be regarded as making an entry into the United States for the purpose of the
immigration laws if the alien proves to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that
his departure to a foreign port or place or to an outlying possession was not intended
or reasonably to be expected by him or his presence in a foreign port or place or in an
7 289 U.S. 422 (1933).
8 Id at 425.
9 "The immigration laws of the United States contain the most detailed enumeration in the world for
disqualification of aliens who may seek admission to a sovereign nation .... WASSERMAN, IMMIGRA-
TION LAws & PRACTICE 39 (3d ed. 1979).
10 See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 454 n.5. The Court cites Jackson v. Zubrick, 59 F.2d 937
(6th Cir. 1932), which held an alien's return from a brief visit to Canada to be an entry within the scope of
the Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29 § 19, 39 Stat. 889 (1917), which authorized deportation on conviction
of crime within five years of entry. Judge Simons, concurring in Zubrick, declared:
Ever since it was first held that a departure, however brief and temporary, and without
regard to intention to relinquish domicile, makes subsequent return a new entry, courts in bor-
der districts have found it difficult to remain silent when the result in human misery of a literal
reading of the act has been realized.
59 F.2d at 938.
11 Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1947).
12 Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388 (1947).
13 158 F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1947).
14 Id at 878.
15 332 U.S. 388 (1947). The Court found that a merchant seaman's return from Cuba after his ship
had been torpedoed was not an entry which could serve as a basis for deportation.
16 Id at 391;accord, Yukio Chai v. Bonham, 165 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1947); Carmichael v. Delaney, 170
F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1948).
17 The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1952).
18 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1976).
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outlying possession was not voluntary .... 19
The legislative history of section 101 (a)(13)20 makes clear that Congress intended
to incorporate in its statutory definition of entry21 the holdings of Di Pasquale and
Delgadillo .
The Supreme Court interpreted section 101 (a) (13) 22 for the first time in Ro-
senberg v. Fleuti.23 George Fleuti, a Swiss national, was admitted to the United
States as a permanent resident in 1952. He remained in this country continu-
ously thereafter except for a visit to Mexico in 1956 of "a couple hours dura-
tion."'24 Fleuti was ordered deported25 because he was excludable at the time of
his reentry in 1956.26 On appeal, the Supreme Court held that Fleuti's return
from Mexico did not constitute an entry and that he therefore could not be de-
ported. In so doing, the Court construed the intentional departure requirement
of section 101 (a)(13)2 7 to require "an intent to depart in a manner which can be
regarded as meaningfully interruptive of the alien's permanent residence. ' '28
The Court's interpretation of section 101(a)(13) 29 looked beyond the plain
words of the statute to incorporate what the Court described as a congressional
intent "to ameliorate the severe effects of the strict 'entry' doctrine." 30 In support
of its construction the Court noted that the legislative history of section
101(a)(13) 3 1 refers 9pecifically to Di Pasquale and Delgadillo,3 2 both liberalizing
decisions. The fact that the legislative history revealed no express congressional
intent to exceed the holdings of those decisions did not hamper the Court.33 In-
19 Id
20 Id
21 As noted in Fleuti, 374 U.S. at 457, quoting H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1952) and
S. REP. No. 1137, 82d Corng., 2d Sess. 4 (1952), both the House and Senate Committee Reports state:
[E]arlier judicial constructions of the term entry in the immigration laws, as set forth in Volpe v.
Smith (289 U.S. 422 (1933)), generally held that the term "entry" included any coming of an
alien from a foreign country to the United States whether such coming be the first or a subse-
quent one. More recently, the courts have departed from the rigidity of that rule and have
recognized that an alien does not make an entry upon his return to the United States from a
foreign country where he had no intent to leave the United States (Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158
F.2d 878 (2d Cir. 1947)), or did not leave the country voluntarily (Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332
U.S. 338 (1947)). Id at 457 n.8.
22 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(13) (1976).
23 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
24 Id at 450.
25 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1976). The Immigration and Nationalization Service (INS) instituted de-
portation proceedings against Fleuti in 1959 on the ground that at the time of his return from Mexico
Fleuti, a homosexual, was "afflicted with a psychopathic personality" under INA § 212(a)(4), 8 U.S.C.
§ I 182(a)(4) (1952) and was therefore excludable as an alien falling under "one or more classes of alien
excludable by the law existing at the time of entry." Id. § 241(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1952), The
Ninth Circuit set aside a deportation order holding that § 212(a)(4) was unconstitutionally vague for fail-
ing to adequately define "psychopathic personality". Fleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652, 657 (9th Cir.
1962). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Ninth Circuit to consider the constitutionality of
§ 212(a)(4). However, the Court decided the case on the issue of statutory interpretation.
26 See note 24 supra.
27 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1976) provides an exception to entry: "[Ain alien having a lawful perma-
nent residence in the United States shall not be regarded as making an entry. . . if the alien proves.
that his departure to a foreign place . . . was not intended . Id
28 374 U.S. at 462.
29 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(13) (1976).
30 374 U.S. at 462.
31 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13) (1976).
32 See note 21 supra.
33 374 U.S. at 458. Justice Clark pointed out in dissent that the actual language of Delgadillo creates
no exception for an alien who "plainly expected" to depart. Id at 460 (Clark, J., dissenting).
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stead, the Court declared that Congress "could not have meant to limit the
meaning of the exceptions it created in § 101(a)(13) to the facts of those two
cases" 34 -a statement without direct supporting authority.
35
The Supreme Court's nonrestrictive reading of section 101 (a)(13)36 in Feuti
was intended to prevent the harshness of excluding or deporting a resident alien
whose brief stay outside the country did nof meaningfully interrupt his status as a
United States resident.37 The Court suggested that whether an interruption of
permanent residence is meaningful should be determined by examining the
length of the resident alien's absence, whether travel documents were necessary
for his departure, the purpose of his trip, and "other possibly relevant factors to
be developed by the gradual process ofjudicial inclusion and exclusion."'38 It has
been this invitation to engage in the "gradual process of judicial inclusion and
exclusion" which has left the characteristics of a meaningful interruption unset-
tled.39 Today there exists no clear, uniform standard for determining what con-
stitutes a meaningful interruption. The absence of an ascertainable standard
creates the possibility of inequitable and unpredictable applications of the law.
III. Current Status of the Fleuti Doctrine
Lower courts have applied the Fleuti doctrine in two related areas of immi-
gration law. One line of cases attempts to mold the rather ambiguous language
of Fleuti into an ascertainable standard for determining when a returning alien
makes an "entry." The other line of cases applies Fleuti's language to a limited
statutory exception allowing aliens to petition the Attorney General for an ex-
emption from deportation under INA section 244(a)(1).4 0 Both lines of cases
confront the question of whether an alien's absence is meaningfully interruptive
of his physical presence in the United States, and both apply the same test.
A. Ent/ Cases
"The precise limits of the Fleuti principle are still being debated."'4 ' Al-
though lower courts faced with "entry" questions have followed the liberalizing
trend of Fleuti, they have all but abandoned the factors suggested by the
Supreme Court for determining a meaningful interruption of physical presence.
Instead, these courts have considered factors not mentioned in F/euti. For exam-
34 374 U.S. at 458.
35 Justice Clark noted that the plain words and legislative history of the statute are clear. An entry is
"any coming" of an alien unless his departure was unintended or involuntary. The statute does not ex-
empt voluntary, intentional excursions outside the United States. Id at 465-66.
36 8 U.S.C. § llOl(a)(13) (1976).
37 374 U.S. at 460-61.
38 Id at 462.
39 See I C. GORDON & H. ROSENFELD, suprfa note 2, § 4-37.
40 8 U.S.C. § 244(a)(1) (1976) provides that the Attorney General may suspend deportation if in his
opinion deportation would cause (1) "extreme hardship" to an alien who has been continuously physically
present in the United States for seven years, or (2) exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to an alien
who has ten years of continuous physical presence. The cases which utilize Flui to test for continuous
physical presence developed primarily in the Ninth Circuit. See, Git Foo Wong v. INS, 358 F.2d 151 (9th
Cir. 1966); Wadman v. INS, 329 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1964); Kamheangpatiyooth v. INS, 597 F.2d 1253 (9th
Cir. 1979); Chan v. INS, 610 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1979). See also Heitland v. INS, 551 F.2d 495 (2d Cir.
1977).
41 Gordon, supra note 5, at 18.
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pie, in Lozano-Giron v. INS 42 the Seventh Circuit announced that the uprooting
caused by deportation is an important factor for consideration. Whether up-
rooting has occurred depends on the alien's family ties, his property or employ-
ment interests in the United States, the nature of the environment to which he
would be deported and his relationship with that environment. 43 Additional fac-
tors suggested by other courts include whether the alien has minor children who
are legal residents or citizens of the United States, 44 whether the alien is legally
present in the United States, whether he relied upon deceptive methods to secure
reentry45 and whether his journey outside the country qualified him for more
useful employment.
46
In addition to considering new factors in assessing whether a meaningful
interruption of physical presence has occurred, the lower courts have also arrived
at divergent interpretations of the factors enunciated in Fleuti. This is most ap-
parent with the "purpose of visit" factor. Fleu/i stated that the strict admission
requirements accompanying entry would be applicable if the purpose for which
the alien left the country was contrary to the policies of the immigration laws.
4 7
The Fifth Circuit held in Pargus-Banelos v. INS 48 that an alien who became in-
volved in illegal smuggling during a brief stay in Mexico did not make an entry
on his return because he did not form an intent to commit the crime prior to
departure. Conversely, in Palatian v. INS,49 the Ninth Circuit held that illegal
activity destroys the innocent character of an absence regardless of whether the
unlawful purpose was formed before or after the alien's departure.
As long as Fleu/i remains the controlling case in this area, lower courts will
have to struggle with the parameters of the "purpose" test. Such confusion is
unnecessary. The time at which the intent to commit an act contrary to immi-
gration policy was formed should not be the basis for differentiating among re-
turning aliens. If differentiation is desired the focus should be upon the nature of
the illegal act committed, not the timing of the decision to commit such an act.
B. The Continuous Presence Cases
The most significant modifications of the Feuti decision have involved the
"continuous presence" line of cases. Section 244(a)(1) of the INA50 permits de-
portation to be suspended if (1) the Attorney General finds the alien is of good
moral character, (2) deportation would cause extreme hardship, and (3) the alien
has been physically present in the United States continuously for not less than
42 See note 5 supra.
43 Id at 77-78. See genera/6y Gordon, supra note 5, at 18.
44 Zimmerman v. Lehmann, 399 F.2d 943 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 925 (1965).
45 Heitland v. INS, 557 F.2d 495 (2d Cir. 1977).
46 Longoria-Castenada v. INS, 548 F.2d 233 (8th Cir. 1977).
47 374 U.S. at 462.
48 Vargas Banelos v. INS, 466 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1972). Compare this holding with that of Yanez-
Jaques v. INS, 440 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1971). In that case a resident alien traveled to Mexico armed with
an ice pick for the express purpose of extracting revenge from two men who had beaten and robbed him.
The alien returned to the United States when he was unable to find his intended victims. The court found
an intent to commit a criminal act prior to departure but held that there was no entry because the evi-
dence did not show any intent to disrupt permanent residence.
49 Palatian v. INS, 502 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1974); accord, Longaria v. Castaneda v. INS, 548 F.2d 233
(8th Cir. 1977).
50 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1976).
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seven years. 5 1
In attempting to define continuous physical presence for purposes of section
244(a)(1), 52 the Ninth Circuit, in Wadman v. INS,5 3 found the definition of a
"meaningfully interruptive absence" to be controlling. The court found no sig-
nificant distinction between the tests for continuous presence and entry54 and
hence applied the Fleuti test to determine whether an absence was meaningfully
interruptive of the alien's continuous presence.
It was the "continuous presence" line of cases which actually came to grips
with the inherent ambiguity that characterized Fleu/i and the subsequent deci-
sions attempting to integrate its meaningful interruption test. Kamheangpaloolh
v. INS 55 was the first decision in which the three-factor test of Feuti was held not
to be dispositive of the continuous presence issue. This case involved a native of
Thailand who entered the United States in 1964 with authorization to remain
until 1976. When he failed to leave the country at the specified time, the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS) instituted deportation proceedings. Pe-
titioner applied for suspension of deportation under section 244(a)(1) of the
INA,56 but was rejected because he had left the country for one month in 1970 to
visit his dying mother. The immigration judge and Board of Immigration Ap-
peals applied the three-factor test of Fleu/i and found petitioner wanting on all
three.
57
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed. Although the court acknowledged
the principle of the Fleuti decision, it found that the lower court's focus on the
three-factor test was incorrect. The court held the Feuti test "only relevant as
evidence of whether an absence reduced the significance of the whole seven-year
period as reflective of the hardship and unexpectedness of exposure to expul-
sion."5 8 Kamheangpat?/ooh incorporated the liberalizing rationale of Fleuti, which
was designed to relieve the harshness that would result from a literal interpreta-
tion of INA sections 101(a)(13) and 244(a)(1). At the same time the Ninth Cir-
cuit enunciated a standard more in line with the recent "entry" and "continuous
presence" decisions than Fleuti. Subsequent Ninth Circuit cases have extended
Kamheangpati)ooth so as to reduce the influence of Fleuti.59
IV. Recent Development
Several recent Ninth Circuit cases indicate that the liberal trend initiated by
51 Id
52 Id
53 329 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1964); see note 10 supra.
54 329 F.2d at 815. The Supreme Court recognized the nexus between continuous presence and the
entry doctrine in Fleuti. The Court rationalized its nonrestrictive reading of § 101(a)(13) on the basis of
the definition of "continuous residence" for purposes of naturalization, citing 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (1952). 374
U.S. at 459. Continuous presence cases may similarily be relied upon for a progressive interpretation of
the Fleuti doctrine in future "entry" cases.
55 597 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1979); accord, Chan v. INS, 610 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 197q); DeGallardo v.
INS, 624 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1980). See generallp Comment, Suspension of Ddportation: A New Approach to the
Continuous Physical Presence Requirement, 10 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 303 (1980).
56 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1976).
57 The immigration judge found that petitioner's 30 day trip covered several thousand miles and
required travel documents. Thus the trip qualified as a meaningful departure under Fleuti. 597 F.2d at
1257.
58 597 F.2d at 1257.
59 See notes 56-60 infia and accompanying text.
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Fleuti has gained momentum. In Chan v. INS,60 the Ninth Circuit held that
length of absence is not determinative of whether an absence meaningfully inter-
rupts continuous physical presence. The court suspended deportation of an alien
and his spouse even though each had taken trips interrupting continuous physi-
cal presence in the United States for as long as three months at a time. In revers-
ing the deportation order the Ninth Circuit considered the personal hardship of
deportation, the fact that petitioners had reason to suspect their travels would
jeopardize their resident status, and the fact that at least one spouse always re-
mained in the United States while the other was outside the country.
61
In De Gallardo v. INS 62 the petitioner overstayed her student visa and was
ordered deported. Referring to the KamheangpatI oolh decision, the Ninth Circuit
overturned the deportation order despite petitioner's three-and-one-half month
interruption of continuous physical presence and her use of a false pretext to
reenter the country.
63
Recently, in Plasencia v. Sureck, 64 the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court's
ruling that an alien apprehended while reentering the United States in an at-
tempt to smuggle illegal aliens into the country was not subject to exclusion in a
summary proceeding at the border. The court held that the INS could proceed
against such a person only in a deportation proceeding. Although the petitioner
may still be deported on basis of an illegal entry, the removal of the threat of
summary exclusionary hearings for resident aliens in this situation represents a
significant procedural safeguard.
Although Plasencia is consistent with the liberal purpose of the Fleuti doc-
trine, the practicality of its approach highlights Fleuti's ineffectiveness. Plasencia
guarantees that aliens returning to the United States will not be excluded at the
border and thus eliminates a particularly harsh element of the reentry doctrine.
V. Conclusion
Today resident aliens face a situation in which statutory language authorizes
practices which are not in line with current immigration policy. Unfortunately,
that policy is applied under such a fluid set of standards that resident aliens are
unable to predict accurately what type of visit outside the country will be held
meaningfully interruptive. Returning aliens face the potential danger that a
court might dredge up strict statutory language and arbitrarily select factors
which will result in their deportation.
The Supreme Court attempted in Rosenberg v. Fleu/i to alleviate the harshness
of the reentry doctrine. This was by no means objectionable. Construing the
immigration laws to reduce the harshness and unpredictability of narrowly
60 610 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1979).
61 Id at 654-55. Although not mentioned as determinative, a factor which impressed the court suffi-
ciently to cause it to discuss it in depth was the petitioners' background. The Ohans entered the United
States as nonimmigrant students in 1968. Dr. Chan had worked since 1975 as a Senior Scientist for Gen-
eral Atomic Co. researching new energy sources. Mrs. Chan had an advanced degree in pharmacy and at
the time of appeal was chief pharmacist at Pomorado Hospital in San Diego County. Id at 653.
62 624 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1980).
63 Mrs. DeGallardo took a three and one-half month vacation in 1973 which interrupted the con-
tinuity of her 15 year physical presence in the United States. Upon returning she obtained a permit to
reenter the country on the pretext that she intended to stay only a few days.
64 637 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir. 1980).
[April 19811
REENTRY OF ALIENS
worded statutes is a desirable response to an unfortunate situation. Recent case
law, particularly in the Ninth Circuit, indicates the liberal approach in "entry"
and "continuous presence" cases can be expected to continue. The Fleuti deci-
sion, however, no longer provides a workable standard for resolving those issues.
It is time the immigration laws were amended to reflect current policy and
enforcement practice. A solution which has been urged time and again and
which clearly reflects current practice is to amend the law to state that "any alien
who returns to an unrelinquished domicile in the United States, whether lawful
or unlawful, after a temporary absence abroad should not be deemed to have
made a new entry." 65 The continuous physical presence requirement of INA
section 244(a)(1) could also be reworded to reflect the concept of unrelinquished
domicile. For example, the Attorney General could be statutorily allowed to sus-
pend deportation of any alien who has maintained an unrelinquished domicile in
the United States for a continuous period of not less than seven years, if he meets
the requirement of good moral character and can show extreme hardship as re-
sult of deportation. Such an amendment would ensure that all resident aliens are
measured by the same standard. Although the concept of unrelinquished domi-
cile is not inherently objective it does offer a familiar standard. It also removes
the irrationality of subjecting a person to stricter immigration laws merely be-
cause he ventured outside the country. Rewording the INA to incorporate the
unrelinquished domicile test would introduce a measure of predictability and
standardization into what is now an unpredictable area of immigration law.
Arnold G Gough
65 Maslow, Deportation Law: Proposalsfor Reform, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 328-29 (1956), citing PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION, WHOM SHALL WE WELCOME. See alSo
Comment, .upra note 2.
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